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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS UNDER THE UNIFORM
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act is one of the
many acts resulting from the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws. This act has been
adopted in seventeen states including Pennsylvania' and
New Jersey.2 Section 1 says, inter alia,
"Creditor is a person having any claim, whether
matured or unmatured, liquidated -or unliquidated, ab-
solute, fixed, or contingent."
Section 9 says,
"Where a conveyance or obligation is fraudulent
as to a creditor, such creditor, when his claim has ma-
tured, may, as against any person except a purchaser
for fair consideration without knowledge of the fraud
-at the time of the purchase, or one who has derived
title immediately or mediately from such purchaser:
(a) Have the conveyance set aside or obligation an-
nulled to the extent necessary to satisfy his claim; or
(b) Disregard the conveyance and attach or levy execu-
tion upon the property conveyed."
The application of these sections is the basis of this note.
Prior to the Act there were two methods by which a
creditor could recover property conveyed by his debtor to
"hinder, delay or defraud" him. As so admirably stated
by Mr. Chief Justice Von Moschzisker; "The established
way to test the question of whether real property has been
conveyed in fraud of creditors is for one claiming to be a
creditor to obtain a judgment and issue execution against
the premises in question as the property of his debtor, this
to be followed by an action of ejectment at the suit of the
purchaser at the sheriff's sale."' While this was a Penn-
sylvania case it applies with equal force to New Jersey and
most states. The other remedy was by a bill in equity to
1Act of 1921, P. L. 1045.
2Act of 1919, Chapter 213.
aSauber v. Nouskajian, 286 Pa. 449.
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have the conveyance set aside. The rule in Pennsylvania
seems to have been that the creditor could not come into
equity' except where the property was "beyond the reach
of the ordinary process of execution."'  New Jersey held
that even in such cases the creditor would have to estab-
lish his claim at law by getting a judgment against the
debtor." There was a seeming exception to these rules of
equity in the case of a trustee in bankruptcy. 7
The Act has had no effect on the remedy at law.8 That
a trustee in bankruptcy may go into equity is particularly
true since the Act. Section 9 makes the relief by bill in
equity, not supplementary to, but concurrent with, the
remedy at law. However, some courts hold that the founda-
tion for the bill must be laid in an action at law. 10 The
extent of this foundation, if any is necessary, is the problem
which seems to be bothering the courts. Even in states
which held, prior to the Act, that some further step other
'Kemmler v. McGovern, 238 Pa. 460; Bank v. Kern, 193 Pa. 59;
Hyde v. Baker, 212 Pa. 224.
5Peoples Nat. Bank v. Loeffert, 184 Pa. 164; Fowler's App., 87
Pa. 449; Houseman v. Grossman, 177 Pa. 453; Curtis and Co. v. Olds,
250 Pa. 320.
8Biglow Blue Stone Co. v. Magee, 27 N. J. Eq. 392, "When a
creditor comes into equity to reach the equitable interest of his
debtor in land, he must show a judgment which would, in case the
legal title to the property were in the debtor, be a legal lien thereon,
and an execution returned unsatisfied. This will show that his
remedy at law is exhausted, and will entitle him to the aid of equity.
It is not necessary in such case to show a levy of execution on the
land which he seeks to reach." Robert v. Hodges, 1 C. E. Green 299;
Dunham v. Cox, 2 Stockt. 437; Cuyler v. Moreland, 6 Paige 273.
7Geary v. Schwem, 280 Pa. 435, Davis v. Hudson, 28 Fed. (2nd)
740.
8Conemaugh W. Co. v. Delano C. Co., 298 Pa. 182: "It (Uniform
Act) does not deprive a creditor of the right, as formerly, to work
out his remedy at law." Penna. Trust Co., v. Schenecker, 289 Pa.
277; Doland v. Burns Lumber Co., 194 N. W. (Minn.) 636; Quellin
v. Gibson, 13 D. & C. 446.
0Geary v. Schwem, 280 Pa. 435; Davis v. Hudson, 28 Fed. (2nd)
740 construing N. J. Act.
10Gross v. Pa. Mtg. & Loan Co., 146 At. (N. J.) 328; Frawley v.
Chakos, 36 Fed. (2nd) 373; Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, 33 Fed.
(2nd) 664.
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than merely getting a judgment was required to get a lien,
those states which have adopted the Act now uniformly
hold that getting a judgment is sufficient to proceed in
equity.1 It is needless to say that if a lien is also acquired,
it will be adequate. 12 In U. S. Realty Corp. v. Asea,18 the
court said, "This statutory provision, we consider, embraces
by implication, creditors whose claims have not only ma-
tured but been reduced to judgment at law, although such
judgment is not impressed as a lien upon the land of the
debtor." This is a proper conclusion because the question
of the existence of the debt is still established at law, and,
if the parties so desire, by a jury. The rule does not take
away the common law right of a debtor to require that
claims against him be established at law. In a few cases,
however, an attempt has been made to have the courts
extend the doctrine to situations where the plaintiff is a
general creditor and has not even attempted to establish
his claim at law. The case of Gross v. Pa. Mtg. and Loan
Co."' on its first appeal, held that such a person was a
creditor within the meaning of the Act. While the question
did not arise in U. S. Realty Corp. v. Asea,15 the court held
as dictum that such part of the Act was unconstitutional.
The point was directly before the Court of 'Errors and Ap-
peals of New Jersey when the case of Gross v. Pa. Mtg. and
Loan Co." was taken before it the second time and the court
held, "The 1919 statute is unconstitutional, to the extent
that it attempts to give the court of chancery authority to
hear and determine actions for debts and for damages
arising out of a breach of contract, which power is solely
"Quackenbush v. Slickel, 9 D. & C. 155; Zook v. Sherk, 12 D. &
C. 322; Fesovitz v. Cordosco Const. Co., 140 Atl. (N. J.) 573; Virgil
State Bank v. Wahl, 228 N. V. (S. D.) 392; Hulsether v. Sanders,
223 N. W. (S. D.) 335; Lipskey v. Voloshers, 141 Atl. (Md.) 402;
Morse v. Roach, 201 N. W. (Mich.) 471.
ilSauber v. Nouskajian, 286 Pa. 449; Dutcher v. Van Duine, 219
N. W. (Mich.) 651; Mason Co. v. Poust, 227 N. W. (Wisc.) 392.
1.3142 Atl. (N. J.) 38.
21137 Atl. (N. J.) 89.
15142 Atl. (N. J.) 38.
10146 Atl. (N. J.) 328.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
within the jurisdiction of the law courts." They base their
decision on U. S. Realty Corp. v. Asea. By reference to that
case we find the reason given is that, according to the con-
stitution of New Jersey, no power of the common law
courts which existed at the time of the adoption of the
constitution may be delegated by statute to the equity
courts. A like case arose in Frawley v. Chakos.7 There the
court said that under the laws of Wisconsin a suit could
not be brought in equity until after the plaintiff had gotten
a judgment at law. In Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines 8 the
court says,19 "The plaintiffs were simple contract creditors
of the company. It is the settled law of this court that such
creditors cannot come into a court of equity to obtain the
seizure of the property of their debtors, and its application
to the satisfaction of their claims; and this notwithstanding
a statute of the state may authorize such a proceeding in
the courts of the state. The line of demarcation between
the equitable and legal remedies in the federal courts
cannot be obliterated by state legislation."
At first glance it would appear that Pennsylvania
should be controlled by these cases but upon closer exam-
ination it will be found that all of them have features that
make their reasoning inapplicable in Pennsylvania. The
New Jersey case does not apply for there is no such con-
stitutional restriction against the granting of the powers
of the law courts to the equity courts. While the case of
Frawley v. Chakos'0 was decided after the Act was passed
in Wisconsin the court wholly overlooked it. They cited as
authority three cases, all of which were decided prior to
the Act. The case of Harrison 'v. Triplex Gold Mines
21
cannot be considered as interpreting the Act since it was
* a federal case and the federal courts have their own equity
rules. Thus we see that although these three cases have
held that the bill was not maintainable, none of them apply
'T36 Fed. (2nd) 373.
1833 Fed. (2nd) 664.
19Citing Hollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co., 150 U. S. 341.
20Note 17.
2"Note 18.
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in Pennsylvania. It appears, therefore, that unless the
courts can find some other grounds for holding the Act un-
constitutional, a creditor will be allowed to come into equity
without first establishing his claim at law, and have set
aside a fraudulent conveyance made by his debtor as has
been done in New York.
22
It seems not only possible but probable that such "other
grounds" may be found in the constitutional provision that
"Trial by jury shall be as heretofore, and the right thereof
remain inviolate." 23  Purdon's Digest 24 interprets this to
mean that "the legislature cannot confer upon a court of
equity the power of trying, according to the course of
chancery, any question which has always been triable ac-
cording to the course of law by a jury"." The duty of
saying whether a tort has been committed or a contract
breached has always been on the law courts. Insofar as
the Act tries to give this duty to an equity court it would
be, apparently, unconstitutional. A creditor would not need
to do anything more at law than get a judgment. The
courts of equity have always exercised the power of declar-
ing conveyances fraudulent, imposing liens, and even set-
ting conveyances aside at the suit of judgment creditors.2 i
The fact that such power has been changed from an un-
usual remedy to a usual one, does not violate the constitu-
tion for "the legislature may enlarge the scope of the equity
jurisdiction of the courts. ' 27  As held in one case, 28 the
plaintiff may get a temporary injunction under the Act to
prevent his debtor's conveying his property before the com-
22Gatto v..Boyd, 137 Misc. 156, 241 N. Y. Supp. 626 which applied
the dictum in American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N. Y. 1, 166 N. E.
783.
23Article 1, Section 6, Constitution of Pennsylvania of 1873.
24Constitution, page 109.
26North Pa. Coal Co. v. Snowden, 42 Pa. 488; Norris' Appeal, 64
Pa. 275; Tillmes v. Marsh, 67 Pa. 507; Grubb's Appeal, 105 Pa. 480;
Duncan v. Hollidaysburg Iron Works, 136 Pa. 478; Penna. Co. v.
Ohio R. R. Co., 204 Pa. 356.
26Note 5.
27Purdon's Digest, Constitution, page 340.
28 Oliphant v. Moore, 293 S. W. (Tenn.) 541.
176 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
pletion of an action at law then pending between the parties.
This will not be unconstitutional.
2 9
To summarize the law in Pennsylvania: a creditor may
proceed at law to avoid a fraudulent conveyance by his
debtor; or he may get a temporary injunction against the
debtor pending the determination of his claim at law; or,
he may establish his claim at law and then have the con-
veyance set aside in equity without regard to the adequacy
of the remedy at law; or, possibly, he may be allowed to
go into equity without first getting a judgment at law. The
existence of this latter right, however, is very doubtful.
Warren C. Lummis, Jr.
29Purdon's Digest, Constitution, page 112,n 11
